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Sergiu Gherghina (University of Glasgow) 
 
Abstract 
Intra-party cohesion is a concept extensively used to assess institutional change and 
behaviour in legislative and party politics. In spite of its popularity, there is confusion about 
its meaning mostly derived from its multidimensional nature. This paper aims to clarify the 
understanding of this term across three different fields of research (legislative studies, party 
factionalism, and Hirschman’s theory applied to intra-party dynamics) and to build a 
conceptual framework that integrates several analytical dimensions. It uses quantitative 
network-based analysis of bibliographic data to provide a descriptive account of connections 
between these fields of the literature. Based on this, it identifies major challenges in the 
study of intra-party cohesion and reveals the necessity to investigate it beyond ideology and 
legislative arena. To this end, we argue and illustrate how Hirschman’s theory applied to 
three levels of analysis allows us to formulate a framework suitable for the study of intra-
party cohesion. 
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Introduction  
Intra-party cohesion (IPC) is important in politics but has shaky theoretical foundations. 
Earlier studies showed that the existence of unified parties has a direct impact on 
government’s survival, coalition behaviour, bargaining power of the party in public office, 
electoral strategies and performance, parties’ representativeness and accountability to 
voters (Giannetti & Benoit 2008; Carey 2009; Kam 2009). At the same time, even when 
political parties are not monolithic structures, dissent and conflicts may shape their 
ideological and policy stances, change organizations (e.g. splits, mergers, switching), re-
invigorate the democratic debate within parties, and enhance electoral performance and 
adaptation (Mair 1990; DiSalvo 2012; Gherghina 2014).  
While the relevance of IPC is well established, the concept involves multiple 
dimensions that have rarely been systematically theorized into one common framework. 
Existing research has conceptualized the term in a unidimensional manner and most studies 
paid extensive attention to the empirical dimensions rather than concept formation. This 
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paper seeks to critically review the way in which IPC has been defined and measured across 
the literature in various fields of politics and to propose a typology. In doing so, our 
endeavour distinguishes between three areas of research that have looked at IPC but have 
remained quite impermeable to each other: (1) studies about the party in public office as 
one of the three faces of a party organization, (2) the literature on party factionalism and (3) 
studies applying  Hirschman’s (1970) framework of “exit, voice and loyalty” to the study of 
intra-party politics. Each of these fields developed its own debates on the definition and 
measurement of different types of IPC, and had to face various methodological challenges. 
These conceptual and methodological debates indicate how this concept can be used as the 
lowest common denominator between these fields. Moreover, a great deal of (recent) 
research has focused on legislative cohesion, with some punctual connections with the 
literature on factions, but with very few appeals to Hirschman’s framework. The central 
argument of this paper is that social-psychological and economic theories of organizations 
revolving around Hirschman’s framework may prove very useful to deepen, enlarge and 
systematize our understanding of IPC. 
The relevance of systematizing our understanding of IPC and of its multiple 
dimensions can be outlined at theoretical, methodological and empirical levels. Moving 
beyond the specificities of this political phenomenon, we construct a typology aiming to 
capture all situations in which IPC occurs. The important theoretical contribution resides in 
the accommodation of several analytical dimensions that were treated in isolation until now. 
The analytical complexity of the resulting typology covers a broad range of situations and 
can represent a solid basis for further studies. One of the immediate consequences is the 
possibility for a better inter-disciplinary studies and exchange of ideas having the same point 
of reference. At methodological level, a typology that is not context, case, or research area 
sensitive allows for comparative studies both across disciplines and across time. 
Furthermore, the typology presented in this paper enhances straightforward 
operationalization of a term that had been rarely measured in a comprehensive way before. 
From an empirical point of view, an unequivocal understanding of IPC leads to richer 
interpretation of the causes and consequences, talking to a broader audience than in the 
current situation when analyses appear to be research field oriented.  
The paper uses an inductive approach and starts with a network analysis of cross-
referenced scientific articles on IPC between 1925 and 2017. This identifies the fields of 
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research in which it was used, with emphasis on the main authors and works, and maps their 
connections. The second section describes how IPC has been defined in the identified fields 
of research. It highlights the common and complementary elements brought to the term by 
different conceptualization. Based on these theoretical approaches, the third section 
suggests a general analytical framework (a typology) that includes several dimensions of IPC. 
The final section discusses the methodological implications and challenges that scholars 
might face when studying IPC.  
 
Mapping the literature: A network-based analysis of bibliographic data 
In order to visualize the most influential publications on IPC, the relationship between fields 
of research and their development over time, we apply a network based analysis of cross-
referenced journal articles. We complement this visualization by a review of the central 
debates and of the theoretical and methodological aspects of these publications. The 
selection of articles involved a three-step process that resulted in 533 publications and 3,196 
citation links. First, citations indexes were imported from the Web of Science bibliographic 
database. Second, we used keywords related to the study of IPC (party ‘cohesion’, ‘unity’, 
‘loyalty’, ‘discipline’, ‘agreement’) and dissent (party ‘switching’, ‘defection’, ‘split’, ‘fission’, 
‘division’, ‘faction’, ‘exit, voice, loyalty’). Third, we scrutinized each abstract and kept only 
the publications related to IPC.1  
Two different software tools (CiteNetExplorer and VOSViewer) were used to import 
the collected citations indexes. CiteNetExplorer displays networks of citation relations 
between published articles through a timeline-based visualization (van Eck & Waltman 2014, 
p.293). VOSViewer takes a distance-based approach and identifies the most cited works and 
their related publications. It can also be used to visualize keyword co-occurrence in a citation 
network (van Eck & Waltman 2014). One of the main limitations of this approach is that Web 
of Science only includes articles (as well as a few chapters and conference proceedings 
referenced online), thus neglects studies published as monographs and edited volumes. This 
slightly biases the analysis. However, by using CitNetExplorer option ‘include non-matching 
references’, the network still includes major books (or chapters) cited in Web of Science 
articles but which are not included in the database (and thus not displaying cross-
                                                          
1 Works on topics such as voters’ loyalty, switching or split-ticket voting, inter-party agreement, or coalition 
unity were removed from the analysis since they were not directly linked to IPC. 
4 
 
references). A second limitation involves that recent publications often do not appear on the 
graphs, as arguably their citation score is not yet high. 
Figure 1 displays the full citation-network as obtained in CitNetExplorer. Only the 70 
most frequently cited publications (including non-matching references cited at least 10 
times) are visible, but the software allows zooming and ‘drilling down’ further into the 
network. The vertical axis represents time, while the horizontal axis reflects the relatedness 
of the publications, i.e. the closer the ‘nodes’, the more related the publications. To identify 
specific research areas, we cluster the empirical evidence: four subgroups may be identified, 
which all appear connected in some way.  
On the left of Figure 1, the purple cluster mostly includes studies on the US Congress, 
as shown by the filiation with Fenno (1978) and Mayhew (1974). This cluster has been 
concerned with the evolution of American parties and with the ongoing debate about the 
importance and strength of parties and individual legislators in the democratic process. This 
debate has led to question the real impact of the party (discipline) on legislators’ behaviour, 
a relationship that has been tested by heavily relying on roll-call data, as introduced by 
Mayhew.  
Directly related to and embedded into these studies, publications identified in the 
blue cluster also deal with IPC in a legislative context, but seek to expand American-based 
theories and methods – as shown by the filiation with Rice (1925; 1928) and his cohesion 
index – outside the US Congress. The most cited publication of the blue cluster is the 
foundational article on the electoral incentives for candidates to distinguish themselves from 
their party and co-partisans (Carey & Shugart 1995).2 Other extensively cited works have 
expanded these ‘incentives’ to the broader institutional context, and have tested the impact 
of various institutional devices on legislators’ behaviour in comparative perspective, e.g. the 
impact of the vote of confidence as shown by the link with Huber (1996) or that of candidate 
selection methods as shown by the link with Gallagher & Marsh (1988). Among these 
comparative studies, we find the work of Carey (2007) and his ‘competing principals’ theory. 
As illustrated by their position further to the right of the network and by their filiation with 
Özbudun (1970), these studies on legislative IPC have moved from the study of presidential 
systems to that of (mostly Western) parliamentary systems. Furthermore, the blue cluster of 
                                                          
2 In Figure 2 this is reflected by ‘personal vote’. 
5 
 
research has been enriched by studies on the European Parliament about the role of 
institutional incentives and ‘principals’ or the methodological use of roll-call voting data. 
On the left-side of this blue cluster, closer to the purple group, some studies have 
examined legislative IPC in young democracies or transition countries: in Brazil, Russia or 
comparatively in Eastern Europe. As illustrated by their citation links, these studies have 
primarily been interested in the ‘electoral connection’ (Mayhew 1974; Cain et al. 1987), that 
is, with the effect of the electoral system on legislators’ behaviours – and by extension, with 
the potential effect of electoral rules on political (in)stability in these new democracies.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
The nature and content of the green cluster on Figure 1 does not strike at first glance: it 
seems to gather several foundational works entrenched in structural approaches to parties 
and party systems (Duverger 1954; Sartori 1976; Panebianco 1988), institutional and rational 
approaches to (legislative) parties  (Strøm 1990; Cox 1997), government formation (Laver & 
Shepsle 1996) and coalition dynamics (Riker 1962; Laver & Schofield 1990). Looking beyond 
these highly cited works, the cluster seems to gather two sub-groups. The first sub-group, 
positioned to the left-side of the network and embedded in the blue and purple cluster, is 
concerned with the reasons for legislators’ switching and with the consequences of such 
behaviour. The second sub-group gathers the literature on factionalism with studies 
primarily concerned with the definition and typology of factions, with their role in dynamics 
of party change and splits and with their bargaining power in processes of coalition building, 
portfolio allocation and party policy formulation. These two sub-groups stand within the 
same cluster given (1) their shared interest in the consequences of defection, switching and 
factionalism on government dynamics and party system stability, (2) their relationship with 
dynamics of party fission and fusion, (3) their common case studies, especially the parties 
and party systems in Japan and Italy, suggesting that factionalism and switching are related 
phenomena. 
The orange cluster in Figure 1 includes publications related to Hirschman’s 
framework (1970) and to the Economic Theory of Democracy (Downs 1957) which had some 
influence on Hirschman’s framework. One seminal article is identified within Hirschman’s 
network, but is actually at the cross-roads of several research areas (Kato 1998). This work 
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examines legislative IPC within Japanese parties through the lenses of Hirschman’s 
framework and considers faction belonging as a potential factor for exit (switching) or voice 
(dissent). Apart from Hirschman (1970), Downs (1957) and Kato (1998), most cited articles 
include the logic of collective action. Relevant publications linking Hirschman’s framework to 
IPC includes, apart from Kato (1998), those of Langston (2002) who analyses elites’ exit voice 
or loyalty in the Mexican dominant (and factionalized) PRI party, and an analysis of party 
members’ exit, voice or loyalty response to the re-foundation of the Italian Communist party 
(PCI) in the early 1990s (Eubank et al. 1996). Other studies not identified in the orange 
cluster do appeal to Hirschman’s framework: some deal with party switching (Heller & 
Mershon 2008) or apply labour economics and management approaches to legislative IPC 
(Garner & Letki 2005).  
Finally, among the publications that were not classified into any cluster in Figure 1, 
there is a small set of publications, mostly on British parties and especially on their divisions 
over the European integration issue. Along these works, we also find publications on 
ideological IPC within Canadian parties, especially among the party on the ground. The rest 
of the unclassified publications are barely related to the rest of the network, and a quite 
substantial number of them are in fact book reviews. Table 1 summarizes the main 
characteristics of these groups. The blue cluster is by far the largest, both in terms of 
publications and citation links. Together with the purple cluster of works, it accounts for 
roughly 60% of the total number of investigated publications.  This indicates the dominance 
of the legislative oriented approach towards IPC. The green cluster oriented towards party 
factionalism accounts for approximately one quarter of the number of articles. The cluster 
with the lowest number of articles and citations among the four is related to Hirschman’s 
theory. The fifth cluster gathers several topics ranging from grassroots party politics to 
European integration topics outside the parliamentary arena.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Figure 2 uses VOSViewer and its clustering option to complement the data presented so far 
in Figure 1 and Table 1. It presents the result of a network analysis of keywords co-
occurrence citation (based on articles’ title and content of the abstract). The graphical 
depiction strengthens the idea of a dominant research on legislative behaviour. The strong 
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impact of the works in the blue cluster from Figure 1 is visible in (light and dark) blue in 
Figure 2 as shown by the keywords ‘institutions’, ‘selection’, ‘incentives’, ‘principals’ (which 
appears in light blue on the left of ‘party discipline’) and ‘behaviour’ (located between 
‘cohesion’ and ‘institution’). A particular case is the analysis of roll-call voting data where the 
keyword can be observed on the upper right corner. The group of publications about 
legislative discipline and general issues related to the party in the public office (specifically, 
in the United-States) are visible on the upper-left corner, in green. The keywords associated 
with research about the potential effect of electoral rules on political (in)stability is visible in 
pink.  
The keywords related to party factionalism (the green cluster in Figure 1) appear in 
turquoise and red. The keywords in turquoise are for legislators’ switching, while the ones in 
red deal with factionalism and overlap to some extent with the legislative IPC. The density 
and importance of keywords encountered in studies about factionalism indicate that this has 
been a research area in which IPC is often encountered.  The studies using Hirschman theory 
(orange cluster in Figure 1) are barely visible through the keywords ‘voice’ and ‘loyalty’ and 
seem embedded into the factionalism literature (the red keywords in Figure 2). Even the 
keywords used in unclassified publications (Table 1) are more prominent: in yellow the ones 
about British politics and European integration; or cut across two fields of research (red and 
green), somewhere around the keywords ‘ideology’, ‘preferences’ and ‘curvilinear disparity’. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this network analysis. The centrality of the keyword 
‘cohesion’ (Figure 2) suggests that the concept of IPC could be used as the lowest common 
denominator between these various fields. The analysis has shown the overall dominance of 
legislative studies, that is, IPC in the party in public office. By contrast, it has illustrated the 
weakness and lack of connection with studies on IPC in the other faces of the party, although 
we found a few studies on (ideological) IPC in the party on the ground, and a few case 
studies on party splits at party congresses. Hirschman’s framework is hardly integrated in 
the whole picture, but more recent publications seem to have brought it back into the study 
of members’ relationship to their party organization in case of (dis)satisfaction (Kemp 2002; 
van Haute 2015) or in terms of ideological congruence (van Haute & Carty 2012; Kölln & Polk 
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2016). On these grounds, the following section uses IPC as a common concept that 
transcends these various literatures. It discusses its multiple dimensions within and across 
disciplines, underlines commonalities, and provides a closer look at Hirschman’s approach. 
 
Characterizing IPC and insights from ‘Exit, Voice & Loyalty’ 
This section starts with a review of the definition(s) and analytical dimensions used for IPC 
across the fields of research identified during the network analysis. Intra-party cohesion is a 
multi-layered concept. At individual level, it can be understood either as an attitude or as a 
behaviour. At aggregate level, IPC can describe the state of a party, for instance along a scale 
or a degree of cohesion, or the force pushing its members to act collectively, i.e. ‘a party 
acting in unison’ (Hazan 2003). While IPC as a behaviour has been examined as both a 
dependent and independent variable (see above), IPC as an attitude (e.g. homogeneity of 
preferences, loyalty) has more often been examined as an independent variable that could 
affect IPC as a behaviour (e.g. voting unity, switching). The conception of IPC as a 
state/attitude or as a force/behaviour, its status in the research design as well as the level of 
analysis (individual or party) at which it is observed have important consequences for its 
measurement. 
The network analysis shows that in legislative studies IPC as a behaviour seems to 
have prevailed and a large body of research has been dedicated to studying its determinants. 
IPC as a behaviour has been equated with party unity (and sometimes also used 
interchangeably with party discipline), and has been used to describe the act of MPs from the 
same party voting in a unitary manner (Janda 1993, p.174; Olson 2003, p.164). A party 
appears united when all MPs vote the same way, or disunited when some MPs vote against 
the party line, or in a different way than the rest of their fellows. Scholars have developed 
several tools to grasp the degree of voting cohesion, such as the index of cohesion (Rice 
1925) or the index of agreement (Attiná 1990).  
Some scholars have considered legislative IPC as a process rather than an outcome 
and they have accordingly pointed out the role of several endogenous mechanisms. This 
approach distinguishes between cohesion and unity, changes the status of cohesion from 
dependent to independent variable (Andeweg & Thomassen 2011), and examines how unity 
is reached at the level of the individual legislator. Voting unity would result mainly from three 
sequential mechanisms (van Vonno et al. 2014) that could be described as dimensions of IPC 
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–and each of which are regularly conceptually equated with IPC.  First, MPs’ homogeneity of 
preferences, also referred to as shared policy preferences (Kam 2001; Hazan 2003) or party 
agreement (van Vonno et al. 2014) – although (Close & Núñez 2017) argue that homogeneity 
of preferences and party agreement should be considered as two different dimensions of 
IPC. Second, the MPs’ internalization of the norm of party solidarity (Hazan 2003) or MPs’ 
sense of party loyalty (Andeweg & Thomassen 2011; van Vonno et al. 2014) has been 
analysed as a psycho-sociological attachment to the party, related to a form of social identity 
or party identification (Raymond & Overby 2014; Raymond & Worth 2016). Third, party 
discipline, which can take the form of positive incentives, such as promises of career 
advancement, or can involve threat of sanction (e.g. demotion) if the MP does not conform 
to the party line. Party discipline would be enforced by the party leaders as an ‘ultimum 
remedium’ (Andeweg & Thomassen 2011) when neither agreement nor loyalty is effective. 
While agreement and loyalty are attitudes, and can be conceived as the ‘voluntary pathway’ 
to IPC, discipline is rather an institutional or organizational constraint, or ‘compulsory 
pathway’ to IPC (Andeweg & Thomassen 2011; van Vonno et al. 2014).  
The literature review and network analysis also indicate that studies of IPC in the 
party in public office looked at legislators ‘exiting’ their party, either to join another party, 
form a new political organization or sit as independent in the parliament (Heller & Mershon 
2009). Party switching has been described as ‘the ultimate lack of cohesion’ (Pedersen & 
Kaldahl Nielsen 2017) or as an extreme form of partisan disloyalty (O’Brien & Shomer 2013). 
Again, this literature has examined how various dimensions of IPC relate to each other, often 
by looking at the extent to which IPC as a behaviour (dependent variable, e.g. staying in the 
party) results from IPC as an attitude (independent variable, e.g. homogeneous attitudes). 
Ideologically cohesive parties would experience less switching and legislators whose 
preferences are closer to that of their party would be less likely to switch (Heller & Mershon 
2008; O’Brien & Shomer 2013; Desposato 2006). Also, legislators would be more likely to 
switch to parties that are ideologically close to their preferences (Desposato 2006; 
Mainwaring & Perez-Linan 1997). Interestingly, party switching may also be a reaction to 
party discipline: legislators would switch to escape strong party discipline (Heller & Mershon 
2008).  
The network analysis suggests a certain overlap of switching and factionalism studies. 
Arguably, collective defections in the party in public office often relate to the existence of 
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intra-party factions (Cox & Rosenbluth 1995; Kato 1998); although usually factions are not 
limited to the parliamentary arena. Central publications on factionalism have been 
concerned with the definition and classification of factions, thus, with what factions are 
(state). As shown below, other relevant publications have adopted a more dynamic 
approach, and have asked what factions do (force), and what are their functional roles 
within the larger party organization. The most mentioned definition is that a faction is ‘any 
intraparty combination, clique, or grouping whose members share a sense of common 
identity and common purpose and are organized to act collectively –as a distinct bloc within 
the party– to achieve their goals’ (Zariski 1960).3 IPC in the form of faction varies along 
several dimensions. Three dimensions have been discussed in the literature: 1) strength 
where they may vary from ephemeral or loosely organized to more institutionalized groups 
(Belloni & Beller 1978; Hine 1982; Bettcher 2005; Panebianco 1988) such as those found in 
some Italian, Japanese and Australian parties (Boucek 2012; Kohno 1992; McAllister 1991; 
Bettcher 2005); 2) motivations or ‘purpose’ with some factions of an ideological or ‘principle’ 
nature (Rose 1964; Bettcher 2005), while others would be built around shared interests, or 
as ‘leader-follower’ groups (Key 1949), although these types often overlap; and 3) 
geographical scope with factions that can occur within one of the faces of the party,  
transcend these faces, or constitute one of the faces (e.g. the parliamentary Fraktion), can 
occur within one or across levels (local, central, provincial) or branches of the party, or 
reflect regional diversity within the party (Stern et al. 1971).   
Depending on their characteristics, factions can fulfil several functions. If well-
organised, they can offer a greater ‘voicing’ power than individualized forms of dissent. If 
they rely on ideological motivations, they can be used to express policy disagreement, and 
operate when the policy orientation of the party is at stake, e.g. within the party in public 
office or when defining the party platform during congresses etc. If they are more of an 
interest-based nature, they are more likely to express dissatisfaction with material incentives 
provided by the organization, and will try to impact the distribution of resources (allocation 
of seats, ministerial portfolios, allocation of resources to specific branches etc.). If built on a 
leader-follower incentive, they will be mostly active in intra-party contests of leader and 
candidate selection. These voicing processes may occur at different or all levels or arenas of 
the party organization. For example, disagreement or dissatisfaction expressed at party 
                                                          
3 Factions themselves thus seem to require a minimum of attitudinal and behavioural internal cohesion. 
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congresses may conduct to altering the platform (Ceron 2012), changing the leadership, and, 
when voice is expressed collectively through organized factions, can result in reversing the 
balance of power between competing groups. Adopting a dynamic approach, Boucek (2009) 
investigates factionalism as a process, occurring through three sequences or forms of 
factionalism: cooperative (different groups are recognized within the party), competitive 
(diffusion strategies allowing for ‘voice’ between intra-groups) and degenerative (when 
factions become too numerous and self-seeking). While the other forms of factionalism may 
be constructive for the organization – ideological debates, leadership renewal etc.–, 
degenerative factionalism has detrimental consequences, which are expressed through ‘exit’ 
in the forms of party split or collapse.  
 
Integrating Hirschman’s approach 
This review of IPC definitions and measurements across these fields of research indicates the 
usefulness of Hirschman’s framework to grasp the processes of IPC. Hirschman’s original 
framework (1970) was developed in the field of economics and attempted to frame how a 
consumer react to a product quality decline: exit (leave the firm, stop buying the product), 
voice (express discontent) or remain loyal. Loyalty has been viewed as an attitudinal factor 
affecting the choice between two behaviours, voice and exit. The framework has been 
successfully applied in other fields but considerably less to politics.4  
Studies applying Hirschman’s framework to the study of IPC brought useful 
amendments to the original theory. The first concerns the perception of quality decline: 
while the original model takes for granted that all members recognize the quality decline in 
the organization at the same time, within a party, individuals might have conflicting 
preferences towards what should be a ‘satisfying’ or a high quality product (Barry 1974; 
Dowding et al. 2000). Thus in a context of party crisis or rupture, be it an organizational or 
ideological (both often occurring simultaneously), some discontented members might voice 
in order to push for change, while others might voice in order to resist change and their 
opinion might differ towards the kind of change that is being proposed (Salucci 2008).  
                                                          
4 The framework was applied to political phenomena by Hirschman in two chapters of his 1970 book, being 
qualified as his ‘weakest’ chapters (Barry 1974). In addition to the works cited in the network analysis, recent 
studies applying Hirschman’s framework to politics include those of Bartolini (2005) and  Clark et al. (2017). See 
also John and Dowding’s (2016) review article on Hirschman’s contribution to political science. 
12 
 
A second amendment involves that voice and exit are not mutually exclusive 
categories, but rather positively correlate (Kato 1998) and the same applies for different 
types of voice (Amjahad 2011; Close 2011). Research highlights a dynamic relationship 
between these behaviours. Party members would adopt silence, voice and exit successively 
–through a kind of sequential ‘voicing’ process– through time, but also throughout different 
arenas: first, voicing in a small committee, then in a larger party meeting, then outside the 
party, for instance in the media. Besides, voice can create exit as much as exit may 
encourage voice: credible exit by those who have previously voiced might encourage other 
members of the organization to put pressure on it by voicing from within (Kato 1998). 
A third amendment refers to the concept of loyalty, which has been mainly conceived 
as a social-psychological variable affecting the choice between different types of response 
behaviours. Again, the sequential aspect of the framework can be highlighted: members can 
feel dissatisfied, but in case of dissatisfaction, they will voice or exit, constructively or 
destructively, their dissatisfaction depending on how ‘committed’ (Saunders et al. 1992) or 
‘attached’ (Cannings 1992) they feel to their organization. Party loyalty would refrain 
grassroots members to exit (Amjahad 2011; Close 2011), but the effect on voice is more 
uncertain: loyalty can either encourage silence or voice.5 This uncertainty seems to result 
from potential conflicting loyalties: loyalty to the party organization or loyalty to the 
ideology embodied by the party (Salucci 2008); loyalty to the party or to one or another 
leader; loyalty to the central party organization or to the local branch of the party (Close 
2011), or to any other sub-group (faction) within the party. In order to remain loyal to an 
ideology, members may consider exiting an organization that deviates from this ideology 
(Salucci 2008).  In a similar vein, feeling more loyal to a sub-branch or sub-group of the party 
may increase members’ likelihood of voicing their disagreement or dissatisfaction with the 
central party organization. Besides, as factions involve ‘a sense of common identity’ (Zariski 
1960), they may create conflicting loyalties for their members that can impact on exit: while 
party loyalty may refrain members from exiting the organization, factional loyalty may have 
the exact opposite effect.  
 
                                                          
5 Party loyalty can affect dissatisfaction: more loyal grassroots members would feel more satisfied than less 
loyal members (Amjahad 2011). 
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A conceptual framework and its applicability 
Hirschman’s framework and its subsequent amendments form the basis of the analytical 
framework we suggest further on. This is meant to provide a common framework for the 
study of IPC as a dynamic phenomenon, its causes and consequences and cuts across the 
three faces of the party. Figure 3 proposes a typology that seeks to systematize the 
understanding of the concept, clarify the research design, and will allow identifying the 
appropriate methodological tools to measure the different types of IPC. It accounts for two 
dimensions: the responses that are mutually exclusive and logically exhaustive within the 
party and the existence of several layers where such responses occur. The responses 
included in the typology are in the form of Hirschman’s framework available at three layers 
that transcend the faces of the party: micro (individual), meso (party groups or units) and 
macro (party level). Since the typology focuses on IPC, the macro level is the political party 
and it differs from the meso level in the sense that the latter deals with various groups of 
members in the party. The typology is a parsimonious analytical tool that distinguishes 
between IPC as attitudinal and behavioural understandings of IPC (a common problem of 
many studies), as a static or dynamic process and the faces of the party where effects can be 
observed. The typology also combines descriptive and analytical issues, and the means 
through which IPC can be reached either through voluntary or compulsory pathways (e.g. 
socialisation versus disciplinary incentives) and bottom-up or top-down processes (e.g. 
discipline imposed to grassroots from the central office; or grassroots pushing the party 
leaders or parliamentary caucus to act cohesively).  
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
 
The cells of the typology are populated with illustrative cases of IPC to provide an indication 
about its broad applicability. To start with the micro level, party switching is one of the most 
common form and it is measured at the level of the party in the public office (MP defection), 
within the party in central office (party elite departures) or at the level of the party on the 
ground (membership loss). All these are instances of exit in which party members at all 
levels leave as a reaction to various decisions within their party (i.e. ideological, socio-
psychological etc.). At the same time, the decision to defect may be caused by poor 
organization of the party or by strategic incentives such as seeking for re-election under the 
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label of a party that is doing better in the polls (Gherghina 2016). Examples of voice include 
all those instances in which (dis)agreement (or sometimes dissatisfaction) between 
members and their party is calculated at the individual level. Two such instances are the 
MPs’ distance from the mean or median party position or the MPs’ subjective distance 
(measured as the difference between the MPs’ self-positioning and the perceived position of 
the party) to their party (Kam 2001).  
This ideological IPC measured at the level of MPs’ attitudes was related to their 
actual IPC behaviour. Disagreement can be associated to voice, and may vary in strength and 
frequency – with usually a few of the MPs or party members expressing publicly their 
disagreement, except in times of party crisis. Survey methods have been used to measure 
ideological IPC in the party on the ground and to identify potential ‘misfits’ (van Haute & 
Carty 2012; Kölln & Polk 2016), i.e. members having preferences quite distant from those of 
their party or party fellows. In the party in the central office, ideological IPC amongst 
activists and officials has been grasped through text analysis of speeches and internal 
debates held during party congresses (Ceron 2015a; Greene & Haber 2016). A third 
dimension of IPC measured at the individual level is loyalty, which has been used to describe 
either a behaviour (legislator toeing the party line) or a social-psychological attitude 
affecting (the choice between) voice or exit.6 Similarly to agreement, party membership 
surveys asked members to express a degree of attachment to their party, to the leader of 
the party, or to different regional branches of that party (Amjahad 2011; Close 2011; van 
Haute 2011). Candidate or MP surveys tend to grasp loyalty as an intended behaviour, with 
typical questions asking respondents to state if, in case of disagreement with their party, 
they ought to vote along their party line or to follow their own opinion. Legislative voting 
data measure actual loyal behaviour. 
The meso level deals with groups of members and is well illustrated by the literature 
examining the structure of opinion within political parties (Norris 1995; Narud & Skare 1999; 
Holsteyn et al. 2015). This body of research used attitudinal surveys to assess the degree of 
ideological IPC between intra-party groups (leaders, MPs, middle-level elites, activists, 
                                                          
6 The concept of loyalty is ambiguous in Hirschman’s framework. It is not our aim to decide whether it should 
be seen as behavioral response to decline in quality, or as a social-psychological attitude affecting the choice 
between response behaviors. Both approaches are valuable to the understanding of IPC. Scholars should 
nevertheless acknowledge the distinction and clarify their position depending on their case study and research 
design. 
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grassroots and voters). As such, this approach sought to identify more or less ‘radical’ groups 
within the party, with potential links with the existence of factions. Collective party 
switching refers to situations in which either groups of MPs or territorial branches leave the 
party due to various reasons. In terms of collective voice, several methods and tools have 
been used to measure ideological IPC at the aggregate parliamentary group level – degree of 
party agreement, homogeneity, dispersion (Warwick 2006) or polarization (Van der Eijk 
2001) of preferences. Among the ‘means’ used to reach IPC, a good example is the ‘caucus 
meeting’ where, when a party is in government, the members of the parliamentary party 
and the members of government can meet, express their positions, voice their disagreement 
behind closed doors and try to reach consensus on the government’s policies (Thomas 1996; 
Wilson 2015). As such, by allowing the expression of voice, these caucuses work as a means 
to increase IPC between the two branches of the party in the public office. Along with this 
mechanism, other positive or negative incentives can be used to increase the loyalty of 
legislators (party discipline). Collective voice in the form of factions has been measured by 
analysing the roll-call voting behaviour of institutionalized factions (Spirling & Quinn 2010). 
Legislative data have also been used to assess factions’ size and bargaining power (Boucek 
2012), which affect their decision to remain loyal or exit the party organization. Outside the 
party in public office, some attempts have been made to grasp factions within the party on 
the ground and network analysis seems to offer promising tools to understand their voice 
and loyalty (Paulis 2017). When presented by institutionalized factions, congress motions 
have served to locate factions in an ideological space (Giannetti & Laver 2009; Ceron 2015a).  
Finally, at the macro level, Hirschman’s concepts do well apply. Party splits usually 
occur after a group of party elites and members decide to collectively exit the party; often 
following a party Congress where these members have voiced their discontent (Ceron 
2015b; Salucci 2008). Like other types of IPC, party splits or fissions are part of the life of a 
party   (Mair 1990), and can give birth to new political actors or result in merges with existing 
parties. Often, these cases of splits occur in factionalized parties (Cox & Rosenbluth 1995; 
Harmel et al. 1995), that is, in parties where ‘voice’ is collectively organized and sometimes 
even institutionalized in the party statutes. Splits and factions may be specific to one face of 
the party, but more generally transcend the three faces of the party organization. 
Ultimately, a high degree of loyalty to the party organization could prevent these splits, even 
in factionalized party, and keep the party united. Party unity can be reached even when the 
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party includes discontent members and/or various ideological currents, through several 
mechanisms (loyalty, discipline, or organisational arrangements that allow and contain 
internal voice). 
 
Conclusions 
This paper provided a typology for the understanding of IPC building on an extensive 
literature review of the concept. The network-based analysis has allowed visualizing the 
connection between different fields of research that have grasped this concept. The analysis 
has illustrated that legislative studies dominated the conceptualization with some 
theoretical and empirical connections with the literature on factionalism beyond the 
parliamentary arena. Some connections have been found with Hirschman’s framework of 
exit, voice and loyalty, but the framework has been only modestly applied to the study of 
IPC. This is somewhat surprising since the Hirschman’s framework provides conceptual tools 
that could easily fit within the study of IPC, especially when conceived as a multidimensional 
and dynamic process. 
The typology combined these bodies of literature to capture different dimensions and 
aspects encompassed in the concept of IPC. It may provide some guidance to researchers 
dealing with IPC and bears several important implications. At theoretical level, the types 
indicate the necessity to draw attention to what occurs within each face of the party 
organization, beyond the legislative arena, but also between these faces. The party in central 
office and party on the ground are crucial arenas for participation and decision-making 
processes that affect the broader democratic and representative process. At methodological 
level, this conceptualization makes measurement easier, enhances the comparative study of 
IPC, and helps developing empirical tools to grasp its dynamism. The application of this 
typology makes the study of IPC and of its multiple dimensions more systematic, increasing 
its comparability across various settings. At empirical level, with this typology one could, for 
example, question and examine the (causal) relationship between several dimensions of IPC 
in and between the different faces of the party, their common or diverging causes, and their 
potential consequences for the party organization and its ability to perform its democratic 
functions.  
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Figure 1: CitNetExplorer visualization of citation network. 
 
Note:  70 most cited publications with direct citation links (N = 533 publications and 3,196 citation links).  
Resolution parameter set at 1.007, with minimum cluster size at 10. 
 
                                                          
7 This relatively low resolution parameter allows to identify ‘a small number of clusters, with each cluster 
including a relatively large number of publications’ (Šubelj et al. 2016, p.13). 
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Figure 2: VOSViewer visualization of keywords co-occurrences network 
 
Items: 107 (minimum number of occurrences: 5). Clusters: 7 (resolution parameter: 1.00, minimum cluster size: 
1 item). Links: 1,972 (100 lines displayed). Total link strength: 3,651. 
 
25 
 
Figure 3: A Typology of IPC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  LEVEL OF OCCURRENCE / EFFECTS 
  Micro Meso Macro 
 
REACTION 
Exit Party switching Collective party switching Splits 
Voice Individual voice  
Voice during Congress 
Collective voice (caucuses) Factionalism 
Loyalty Legislators’ compliance 
Members’ loyalty   
PPO discipline 
Branch loyalty 
Party unity 
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Table 1: Characteristics of the clusters identified in Figure 1 
 Colour of cluster Number of  publications Number of  citation links 
Group 1 Purple 92 414 
Group 2 Blue 200 1,277 
Group 3 Green 125 505 
Group 4 Orange 37 67 
(Group 5) Unclassified 79 20 
Total  533 2,677 
 
 
